Compliance Evidence
Thoth-ATO is built so that every cycle produces auditor-grade evidence by default. There is no separate compliance bolt-on. The signed verdict plus the KMS audit trail are the evidence artifacts.
This page maps Thoth-ATO’s artifacts to specific clauses of:
- EU AI Act (high-risk obligations, effective August 2026)
- Colorado AI Act (effective June 2026)
- SOC2 Type II Trust Services Criteria
- ISO 27001:2022 Annex A
And closes with a “how to extract evidence” runbook auditors can follow.
Regulatory landscape
Section titled “Regulatory landscape”| Regulation | Status | Effective | Applies to |
|---|---|---|---|
| Colorado AI Act (CAIA, SB24-205) | Enacted | June 2026 | ”High-risk” AI systems in CO market |
| EU AI Act — high-risk obligations | Enacted | August 2026 | High-risk AI in EU; Annex III categories |
| EU AI Act — GPAI provisions | Enacted | August 2025 | General-purpose AI model providers |
| SOC2 Type II | Voluntary | Ongoing | Service organizations |
| ISO 27001:2022 | Voluntary | Ongoing | Information security management |
| NIST AI RMF 1.0 | Voluntary framework | Ongoing | Mapped via SOC2 CC overlay |
Data-flow boundary
Section titled “Data-flow boundary”Your source code stays in your editor. Orchestration metadata (specs, plans, principle scores) and cryptographically signed verdicts transit the Thoth platform for immutable audit logging. Fully cloud-isolated self-host / VPC deployment is a Q3 2026 roadmap capability — see Pricing.
Evidence flow
Section titled “Evidence flow”Every governed cycle emits:
- Signed verdict — Ed25519 signature over a canonical JSON payload (JCS, RFC 8785) scoring the deliverable on 6 principles. Signed by a Cloud KMS key version.
- KMS audit log — Cloud Audit Logs entry for the
AsymmetricSignoperation: who, when, which key version, request hash. Immutable. At launch, access this via the manual API export (Step 2 below) or the on-disk verdicts under.thoth/verdicts/; a customer-readable BigQuery audit sink with automated compliance evidence export is an Enterprise — Q3 2026 roadmap capability. - Constitution reference — Hash of the constitution the Judge enforced for this cycle. The constitution itself is hash-addressed and immutable.
- Deliverable hash — SHA-256 of the deliverable bundle. Binds the verdict to a specific output.
- Approval gate log — Who approved which gate, when. Captured locally in
.thoth/cycles/<id>/gates.jsonland synced to the remote console for--remotecycles.
This chain is independently verifiable — see Verdict verification.
EU AI Act — high-risk obligations (August 2026)
Section titled “EU AI Act — high-risk obligations (August 2026)”| Article | Obligation | Thoth-ATO evidence |
|---|---|---|
| Art. 9 | Risk management system | Constitution defines per-principle thresholds; verdict scores prove enforcement on every cycle; constitution version pinned by SHA-256. |
| Art. 10 | Data and data governance | Local execution → source code stays in the editor. Remote console processes specs/plans/verdicts only (orchestration metadata + signed verdicts); never raw source. Fully cloud-isolated self-host / VPC deployment is a Q3 2026 roadmap capability. |
| Art. 11 | Technical documentation | Verdict JSON + spec + constitution snapshot = a self-contained technical record per system iteration. |
| Art. 12 | Record-keeping (logs) | Verdict + KMS audit log per cycle. Retention is customer-controlled (verdicts are on-disk in customer’s repo). |
| Art. 13 | Transparency to deployers | Verdict JSON is human-readable; principles are explicitly documented; deployer can read the JSON without tooling. |
| Art. 14 | Human oversight | Approval gates at Specify → Plan → Execute. Each gate is logged with operator identity. |
| Art. 15 | Accuracy, robustness, cybersecurity | Signed verdict prevents tampering; Ed25519 + KMS-managed keys; KMS key rotation policy enforced. KMS keys use Cloud KMS software protection at launch (Ed25519 is FIPS 186-5 algorithm-approved). |
| Art. 16 | Provider obligations (CE marking) | The per-cycle verdict + constitution + deliverable-hash chain supports the technical-file requirement of Annex IV; assemble it at launch via the manual API export or on-disk .thoth/verdicts/. (One-click audit-bundle / BigQuery export is an Enterprise — Q3 2026 roadmap capability.) |
| Art. 17 | Quality management system | Per-cycle principle scores + rejection rate provide QMS metrics. |
| Art. 18 | Document retention | Verdicts + signed audit-log chain retained per our documented retention schedule (10 yrs from market placement). |
| Art. 19 | Logs retention | Per Section 11.7 of Terms of Service: verdict + audit-log chain retained 7 years (exceeds Art. 19’s 6-month minimum). |
| Art. 26 | Deployer obligations | Thoth-ATO supplies log access, model cards, and human-oversight interfaces so deployers can satisfy their Art. 26 duties. |
| Art. 27 | Fundamental rights impact assessment | FRIA template + guidance provided for deployers; Thoth-ATO does not perform FRIA on the deployer’s behalf. |
| Art. 50 | Transparency for certain AI systems | In-product disclosure that the Service is AI; watermarking guidance for synthetic outputs. |
| Art. 53 + Annex XI | GPAI-model providers | Not applicable to provider obligations — Thoth-ATO does not self-host a GPAI model. Upstream-provider attestations relied upon (Anthropic / Google / OpenAI). |
| Art. 55 | GPAI with systemic risk | Not applicable — see Art. 53. Upstream-provider posture tracked. |
| Art. 86 | Right to explanation | Verdict surfaces why a deliverable was approved or rejected — principle thresholds, missed criteria. |
Colorado AI Act (June 2026)
Section titled “Colorado AI Act (June 2026)”The CAIA (Colo. Rev. Stat. § 6-1-1701 et seq., SB24-205) regulates “high-risk artificial intelligence systems” that make “consequential decisions” about consumers in CO. Even when Thoth-ATO is used as a developer tool (not itself a high-risk system), the verdict trail satisfies key downstream obligations of any AI feature you ship.
| Section | Obligation | Thoth-ATO evidence |
|---|---|---|
| § 6-1-1702 | Developer duty of reasonable care to avoid algorithmic discrimination | Security principle threshold + per-cycle verdict score; custom constitutions can add a bias principle. |
| § 6-1-1702(2) | Developer documentation to deployers | This documentation site + model-card disclosures + verdict-export tooling. |
| § 6-1-1703 | Deployer duty of reasonable care | Verdict + audit-log export gives the deployer the artifacts they need to discharge their own duty. |
| § 6-1-1703(3) | Deployer notice to consumers | Verdict JSON is consumer-shareable; constitution hash + principle scores explain the basis of an adverse decision. |
| § 6-1-1703(5) | Public risk-management statement | This page is the public-facing statement. |
| § 6-1-1703(7) | Notice to Colorado AG of discovered algorithmic discrimination within 90 days | Documented internal AG-notification escalation runbook. |
SOC2 Type II — Trust Services Criteria
Section titled “SOC2 Type II — Trust Services Criteria”Thoth-ATO is positioned to support a customer’s SOC2 attestation by providing evidence-grade artifacts for change-management and security-monitoring criteria.
| TSC | Criterion | Thoth-ATO evidence |
|---|---|---|
| CC1.1 | COSO Principle 1: integrity & ethics | Constitution codifies ethical thresholds enforced by Judge. |
| CC2.1 | Information & communication | Verdict JSON is the communicated control state. |
| CC3.1 | Risk assessment | Per-principle threshold definitions + verdict scores. |
| CC4.1 | Monitoring activities | KMS audit log + verdict archive. |
| CC5.1 | Control activities | Approval gates as compensating controls. |
| CC6.1 | Logical & physical access | API key scopes, OS keychain storage of secrets, KMS-protected keys. |
| CC6.6 | Logical access — encryption | Ed25519 signing, KMS-managed keys, TLS 1.3. KMS keys use Cloud KMS software protection at launch (Ed25519 is FIPS 186-5 algorithm-approved). |
| CC6.7 | Restricted info transmission | Local-first architecture — in a local cycle, source code and secrets stay on the developer’s machine; the governed cycle commits an Ed25519-signed verdict to the developer’s git. Fully cloud-isolated self-host / VPC deployment is a Q3 2026 roadmap capability. |
| CC7.1 | Detection of security events | Verdict tampering detection via signature verification. KMS audit log of every sign operation. |
| CC7.2 | Anomaly monitoring | Principle-threshold rejections (status=rejected cycles) flag deliverables outside policy. |
| CC8.1 | Change management | Each cycle is a signed change record. Verdict + deliverable hash + constitution hash form an immutable provenance chain. |
| CC9.1 | Risk mitigation | Constitution-enforced principle thresholds. |
| CC9.2 | Vendor management | Verdict verification needs only the public key — verifier does not depend on Thoth-ATO availability. |
| A1.1 | Availability — capacity planning | Per-tenant rate-limit headers; Enterprise SLA contract. |
ISO 27001:2022 — Annex A
Section titled “ISO 27001:2022 — Annex A”| Annex A | Control | Thoth-ATO evidence |
|---|---|---|
| A.5.1 | Policies for information security | Constitution + per-principle thresholds, version-controlled. |
| A.5.7 | Threat intelligence | Security principle score per cycle. |
| A.5.23 | Information security in cloud services | KMS-managed keys, customer-controlled retention. (BigQuery audit-log sink is an Enterprise — Q3 2026 roadmap capability.) |
| A.5.30 | ICT readiness for business continuity | Verdict verifiable offline; public-key snapshot enables verification without Thoth-ATO. |
| A.8.2 | Privileged access rights | API key scopes (cycles:write, keys:write, admin). |
| A.8.5 | Secure authentication | Bearer-token auth; key in OS keychain; TLS 1.3. |
| A.8.16 | Monitoring activities | Verdict + KMS audit log archive. |
| A.8.24 | Use of cryptography | Ed25519 / RFC 8785 documented; key rotation policy disclosed. KMS keys use Cloud KMS software protection at launch (Ed25519 is FIPS 186-5 algorithm-approved). |
| A.8.25 | Secure development life cycle | Constitution-driven Specify→Plan→Execute→Verdict pipeline. |
| A.8.28 | Secure coding | Security principle threshold; Judge rejects insecure deliverables. |
| A.12.1.2 | Change management | Each cycle = signed change record. |
| A.12.4.1 | Event logging | KMS audit log + verdict transcript. |
| A.18.1.3 | Protection of records | Signed verdicts immutable by definition. |
NIST AI RMF mapping (informational)
Section titled “NIST AI RMF mapping (informational)”| RMF Function | RMF Subcategory | Thoth-ATO support |
|---|---|---|
| GOVERN | GOVERN 1.1 (policy) | Constitution as policy artifact. |
| MAP | MAP 2.3 (system context) | Spec capture during Specify phase. |
| MEASURE | MEASURE 2.7 (security) | Security principle score. |
| MANAGE | MANAGE 1.3 (risk response) | Judge rejection path; rejected cycles cannot ship. |
How to extract evidence — auditor runbook
Section titled “How to extract evidence — auditor runbook”A five-step process for auditors and internal compliance teams.
Step 1 — Identify the period of interest
Section titled “Step 1 — Identify the period of interest”Pick a date range. For SOC2 Type II audits, this is typically the audit window (e.g. Q1 of fiscal year). For EU AI Act conformity assessment, it’s the prior 12 months.
Step 2 — Query the verdict store
Section titled “Step 2 — Query the verdict store”For local cycles, verdicts live in .thoth/verdicts/*.json in customer repositories. For remote cycles, query the API:
curl -H "Authorization: Bearer $KEY" \ "https://api.thothato.io/api/v1/cycles?from=2026-01-01&to=2026-03-31&status=completed,rejected" \ > cycles.jsonlStep 3 — Assemble the audit bundle
Section titled “Step 3 — Assemble the audit bundle”At launch, assemble the bundle yourself from the API export (Step 2) plus the on-disk verdicts and constitution snapshots under .thoth/. A one-click pre-packaged download from the dashboard, backed by the BigQuery audit sink and automated compliance evidence export, is an Enterprise — Q3 2026 roadmap capability. The bundle layout either path produces:
audit-bundle-2026-Q1.zip├── verdicts/ # Signed verdict JSON per cycle├── kms-audit-log.jsonl # Cloud Audit Logs export for AsymmetricSign ops├── constitutions/ # Hash-addressed constitution snapshots├── public-keys/ # KMS public keys (versioned, current + retired)├── gates.jsonl # Approval-gate operator log└── README.md # Verification instructionsStep 4 — Verify the chain independently
Section titled “Step 4 — Verify the chain independently”The bundle includes verification scripts in Node, Python, Go, and Rust. See Verdict verification for the protocol. The auditor runs verification themselves — they do not need to trust Thoth-ATO infrastructure.
node verify-all.js audit-bundle-2026-Q1/verdicts/# verdicts: 412 verified, 0 tampered, 0 missing-keyStep 5 — Archive
Section titled “Step 5 — Archive”Audit bundles are tamper-evident on their own (every verdict is signed; the bundle ships with the public keys). Standard practice: archive the bundle in WORM storage (S3 Object Lock, GCS Bucket Lock, immutable Azure Blob) for the regulatory retention period — 10 years for EU AI Act Art. 12 records, 7 years for SOC2.
Questions?
Section titled “Questions?”Contact compliance@thothato.io for letters of attestation, customer-specific control mappings, or auditor-direct support.
What’s next?
Section titled “What’s next?”- Verdict verification — the cryptographic foundation behind every evidence artifact described here.
- API reference — programmatic access to cycles and audit data.
- Pricing — Enterprise plans for regulated buyers.